Recent empirical studies of dividend taxation have found that: (1) dividend tax cuts cause large, immediate increases in dividend payouts, and (2) the increases are driven by …rms with high levels of shareownership among top executives or the board of directors. These …ndings are inconsistent with existing "old view" and "new view" theories of dividend taxation. We propose a simple alternative theory of dividend taxation in which managers and shareholders have con ‡icting interests, and show that it can explain the evidence. Using this agency model, we develop an empirically implementable formula for the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation. The key determinant of the e¢ ciency cost is the nature of private contracting. If the contract between shareholders and the manager is second-best e¢ cient, deadweight burden follows the standard Harberger formula and is second-order (small) despite the pre-existing distortion of over-investment by the manager. If the contract is second-best ine¢ cient -as is likely when …rms are owned by di¤use shareholders because of incentives to free-ride when monitoring managers -dividend taxation generates a …rst-order (large) e¢ ciency cost. An illustrative calibration of the formula using empirical estimates from the 2003 dividend tax reform in the U.S. suggests that the e¢ ciency cost of raising the dividend tax rate could be close to the amount of revenue raised.
Introduction
The taxation of dividend income has generated substantial interest and controversy in both academic and policy circles. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by proposing a new theory of dividend taxation based on the agency theory of the …rm (Jensen and Meckling 1976) .
Our model builds on the two leading existing theories of dividend taxation and corporate behavior: the "old view" (Harberger 1962 , 1966 , Feldstein 1970 , Poterba and Summers 1985 and the "new view" (Auerbach 1979 , Bradford 1981 , King 1977 . The old view assumes that marginal investment is …nanced by the external capital market through new equity issues.
Under this assumption, the taxation of dividends raises the cost of capital and, as a result, has a negative e¤ect on corporate investment, dividend payouts, and overall economic e¢ ciency.
The new view assumes that marginal investment is …nanced from the …rm's retained earnings.
In this case, the dividend tax rate does not a¤ect the cost of capital because the dividend tax applies equally to current and future distributions. Therefore, the dividend tax rate does not a¤ect the investment and dividend payout decisions of the …rm, and has no e¤ect on economic e¢ ciency. 1 There has been a longstanding debate in the empirical literature testing between the old and new views. Feldstein (1970) , Poterba and Summers (1985) , Hines (1996) , and Poterba (2004) document a negative association between dividend payments and the dividend tax rate in the time series in the U.S. and U.K, consistent with the old view. In contrast, Auerbach and Hassett (2002) present evidence that retained earnings are the marginal source of investment funds for most corporations in the U.S., a …nding that points in favor of the new view.
More recently, several papers have studied the e¤ect of the large dividend tax cut enacted in 2003 in the U.S. (Chetty and Saez (2005) , Brown et al. (2007) , Nam et al. (2005) ). Chetty and Saez documented four patterns: (1) Regular dividends rose sharply after the 2003 tax cut, with an implied net-of-tax elasticity of dividend payments of 0.75. (2) The response was very rapid -total dividend payouts rose by 20% within one year of enactment -and was stronger among …rms with high levels of accumulated assets. (3) The response was much larger among …rms where top executives owned a larger fraction of outstanding shares (see also Brown et al. (2007) and Nam et al. (2005) ). (4) The response was much larger among …rms with large shareholders on the board of directors. 2 It is di¢ cult to reconcile these four …ndings with the old view, new view, or other existing theories of dividend taxation. The increase in dividends appears to support the old view because dividends should not respond to permanent dividend tax changes under the new view. 3 However, the speed of the response is too large for a supply-side mechanism where dividend payouts rise because of increased investment eventually leading to higher pro…ts and dividend payouts. 4 The rapid dividend payout response could be explained by building in a signaling value for dividends as in John and Williams (1985) , Poterba and Summers (1985) , or Bernheim (1991) . However, neither the signaling model nor the standard old and new view models would predict …ndings (3) and (4) on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the dividend payout response by …rm ownership structure. 5 In this paper, we propose a simple alternative model of dividend taxation that matches the four empirical …ndings described above. The model is motivated by agency models of …rm behavior that have been a cornerstone of the corporate …nance literature since the pioneering work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984) , and Jensen (1986) . 6 Our model nests the neo-classical old view and new view models but incorporates agency e¤ects: managers have a preference for retaining earnings beyond the optimal level from the shareholders' perspective. We model this preference as arising from perks and pet projects, although the underlying source of the con ‡ict between managers and 2 Earlier work by Desai, Fritz, and Hines (2002) also found support for the agency view in the context of dividend remittances of foreign a¢ liates of U.S. multinational …rms. 3 One way of reconciling the dividend increase with the new view is if the tax cut was perceived as temporary by …rms. However, Auerbach and Hasset (2005) document that the share prices of immature …rms that are predicted to pay dividends in the future rose when the reform was announced, suggesting that …rms perceived the tax cut as fairly permanent. In any case, the basic new view model would not explain …ndings (3) and (4) even for a temporary tax cut. 4 Poterba's (2004) estimates using an old view model imply that the 2003 tax reform should increase dividend payments by 20 percent in the long run, but that the adjustment process is slow, with only a quarter of the long-run e¤ect taking place within three years. 5 The empirical evidence is also not fully explained by Sinn's (1991) "life cycle" theory, which synthesizes the old view and new view in a model where …rms start as old view …rms and become new view …rms once they have accumulated su¢ cient internal funds, at which point they start paying dividends. In that model, the payout response should be very small among mature …rms with high levels of accumulated assets, but the data exhibit the opposite pattern.
6 Several empirical studies have provided support for the agency theory as an explanation of why …rms pay dividends (see e.g., Christie and Nanda, 1994 , LaPorta et al., 2000 , Fenn and Liang, 2001 . Empirical studies have provided support for the predictions of the signalling theory of dividends as well (e.g. Wantz 1995, Bernheim and Redding 2001) . See Allen and Michaely (2003) for a critical survey of these two literatures. It is of course possible that both signalling and agency e¤ects are at play empirically.
shareholders does not matter for our analysis. Shareholders can provide incentives to managers to invest and pay out dividends through costly monitoring and through pay-for-performance (e.g. giving managers shares of the …rm). Only the large shareholders of the …rm choose to monitor the …rm in equilibrium because of the free-rider problem in monitoring. Since managers have a higher preference for retained earnings than shareholders, they over-invest in wasteful projects and pay too few dividends relative to the …rst-best.
In this agency model, a dividend tax cut leads to an immediate increase in dividend payments because it increases the relative value of dividends for the manager and increases the amount of monitoring by large shareholders. Firms where managers place more weight on pro…t maximization -either because the manager owns a large number of shares or because there are more large shareholders who monitor the …rm -are more likely to increase dividends both on the extensive and intensive margins in response to a tax cut. Hence, the agency model o¤ers a simple explanation of the empirical …ndings from the 2003 tax cut and prior reforms that is consistent with evidence that marginal investment is funded primarily out of retained earnings.
The e¢ ciency costs of dividend taxation in the agency model di¤er substantially from the predictions of neoclassical models. Since dividend taxation a¤ects dividend payouts, dividend taxes always create an e¢ ciency cost, irrespective of the marginal source of investment funds.
The magnitude of the e¢ ciency cost depends fundamentally on whether the contract between shareholders and managers is second-best e¢ cient, i.e. if it maximizes total private surplus (excluding tax revenue) given the costs of monitoring and incentivizing the manager. If the contract is second best e¢ cient, the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation takes the standard Harberger triangle form, and is small (second-order) at low tax rates. An important implication of this result is that the pre-existing distortion of excessive investment by the manager does not by itself lead to a …rst-order deadweight burden from taxation. This result contrasts with the common view that the e¢ ciency costs of taxing markets with pre-existing distortions are large (…rst-order). The conventional "Harberger trapezoid" intuition -which is based on a market with an exogenously …xed pre-existing distortion -breaks down when the size of the distortion is endogenously set at the second-best e¢ cient level. 7 However, if the contract between shareholders and the manager is not second best e¢ cient, dividend taxation does create a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost. In our model, such second-best ine¢ ciencies arise when companies are owned by di¤use shareholders. Each shareholder does not internalize the bene…ts of monitoring to other shareholders (a free-riding problem), and as a result monitoring is under-provided in equilibrium. In this situation, a corrective tax, such as a dividend subsidy, would improve e¢ ciency. A dividend tax creates precisely the opposite incentive for the monitors, and leads to a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost. Thus, when managers' interests di¤er from shareholders and companies are owned by di¤use shareholders -which is perhaps the most plausible description of modern corporations given available evidence Vishny 1986, 1997 ) -dividend taxation can create substantial ine¢ ciency.
Our analysis yields a simple yet fairly robust formula for the deadweight cost of taxation that nests the old and new view results. The formula is a function of a small set of empirically estimable parameters such as the elasticity of dividend payments with respect to the tax rate and the fraction of shares owned by executives and the board of directors. The formula is una¤ected by allowing for equity issues, costly debt …nance, or corruption within the board of directors. 8 We provide an illustrative calibration using estimates from the 2003 tax reform.
The calibration shows that the marginal e¢ ciency cost of raising the dividend tax from the current rate of 15% could be of the same order of magnitude as the amount of revenue raised.
More than 80% of the e¢ ciency cost arises from the agency e¤ect rather than the Harberger channel emphasized in the old view model. In addition to drawing heavily from well established models in the corporate …nance literature, our analysis is related to two contemporaneous theoretical studies motivated by evidence from the 2003 dividend tax cut. Gordon and Dietz (2006) contrast the e¤ects of dividend taxation in new view, signalling, and agency models. While our analysis shares some aspects with the model they develop, there are two important di¤erences. First, since our framework is streamlined to focus exclusively on agency issues, we are able to derive additional results on …rm behavior and e¢ ciency costs. 9 Second, Gordon and Dietz assume that dividend payout decisions are always made by shareholders (as opposed to management) to maximize their 8 An important limitation of the formula is that it does not account for share repurchases. Like most existing theories of dividend taxation, we abstract from share repurchase decisions in our model. See section 5 for a discussion of how share repurchases would a¤ect the e¢ ciency results. 9 We discuss the connections between our analysis and that of Gordon and Dietz in greater detail in sections 4 and 5. total surplus. This assumption leads to very di¤erent results in both the positive and e¢ -ciency analysis. Gordon and Dietz's model does not directly predict a link between executive or board shareownership and behavioral responses to dividend taxation. In addition, taxing dividends does not create a …rst-order distortion in their model, since there is no pre-existing distortion and dividends are always set at the second-best e¢ cient level. A second recent study is Korinek and Stiglitz (2006) , who build on Sinn's (1991) model to analyze the e¤ects of temporary changes in dividend tax rates. They incorporate …nancing constraints and establish new results on intertemporal tax arbitrage opportunities for …rms. In contrast with our model, Korinek and Stiglitz assume that retained earnings are allocated e¢ ciently by the manager. As a result, they obtain the new view neutrality result that permanent dividend tax policy changes have no e¤ects on economic e¢ ciency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a simple twoperiod model that nests the old and new views as a benchmark reference. In section 3, we introduce agency issues into the model and characterize manager and shareholder behavior. In section 4, we characterize behavioral responses to dividend taxation in the agency model, and compare the model's predictions with available empirical evidence. In section 5, we analyze the e¢ ciency consequences of dividend taxation in a set of agency models that make di¤erent assumptions about the formation of contracts between shareholders and managers. Section 6 provides an illustrative calibration of the general formula derived for deadweight burden. Section 7 concludes.
The Old and New Views in a Two-Period Model
We begin by developing a two-period model that nests the old view and new view, which serves as a point of departure for our agency analysis. Consider a …rm that has initial cash holdings of X at the beginning of period 0. The …rm can raise additional funds by issuing equity, which we denote by E. The …rm's manager can do two things with the …rm's cash holdings: pay out dividends or invest the money in a project that yields revenue in the next period. Let I denote the level of investment and f (I) the revenue earned in period t = 1. Let D = X + E I denote the …rm's dividend payment in period 0. In period 1, the …rm closes and pays out f (I) as a dividend to its shareholders. Assume that the production function f is strictly concave. A tax at rate t d is levied on dividend payments in all periods. Investors can also purchase a government bond that pays a …xed interest rate of r (which is una¤ected by the dividend tax rate), and therefore discount pro…ts at a rate r. 10 The manager's objective is to maximize the value of the …rm, given by
There are three choice variables: equity issues, dividend payments, and investment. To characterize how these variables are chosen, it is useful to distinguish between two cases: (1) A cash-rich …rm, which has cash X such that f 0 (X) 1 + r and (2) a cash-constrained …rm, which has cash X such that f 0 (X) > 1 + r.
Cash-Rich Firms -The New View. First observe that the …rm will never set E > 0 and D > 0 simultaneously. If a …rm both issued equity and paid dividends, it could strictly increase pro…ts by reducing both E and D by $1 and lowering its tax bill by $t d . Hence, any …rm that wishes to raise additional funds will not pay dividends.
Now consider the marginal value of issuing equity when D = 0 for the cash-rich …rm, which is given by
Hence, a cash rich …rm sets E = 0 and simply splits its prior cash holding X between investment and dividends: I = X D. Now consider the optimal choice of dividends, denoted by D :
Hence the optimal dividend payout rate is determined by the …rst order condition
Intuitively, …rms invest to the point where the marginal product of investment f 0 (I) equals the return on investment in the bond, 1 + r. We denote by I S this socially e¢ cient investment level. Note that the optimal dividend payment and investment level do not depend on the dividend tax rate t d . This is the classic "new view"dividend tax neutrality result obtained by Auerbach (1979) and others. The source of this result is transparent in the two period case:
the (1 t d ) term factors out of the value function in equation (1) when E = 0. Intuitively, the …rm must pay the dividend tax regardless of whether it pays out money in the current period or next period. As a result, dividend taxation has no impact on …rm behavior and economic e¢ ciency when …rms …nance the marginal dollar of investment out of retained earnings.
Cash-Constrained Firms -The Old View: Now consider a …rm with X such that f 0 (X) > 1 + r. The marginal value of paying dividends when E = 0 for this …rm is
Hence a cash-constrained …rm never pays dividends in the …rst period: since the marginal product of investment exceeds the interest rate, it is strictly preferable to invest all retained earnings. This …rm therefore invests all the cash it has: I = X + E. Now consider the optimal choice of equity issues, denoted by E :
The optimal equity issue is given by the conditions
These conditions show that …rms which …nance their marginal dollar of investment from new equity issues invest to the point where the marginal net-of-tax return to investment I = X + E , equals the return on investment in the bond, 1 + r. Firms that have X su¢ ciently large so that (1 t d )f 0 (X) < 1 + r have a net-of-tax return below the interest rate for the …rst dollar of equity. They therefore choose the corner solution of no equity (and no dividends, since they have f 0 (X) > 1 + r) because of the tax wedge.
Implicit di¤erentiation of equation (4) shows that @I =@t d < 0 and @E =@t d < 0 for …rms at an interior optimum. For a su¢ ciently large tax cut, …rms who were at the corner solution E = 0 begin to issue equity. These are the standard "old view"results that an increase in the dividend tax rate reduces equity issues and investment. To calculate the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation for cash constrained …rms, denote by P = D + f (I)=(1 + r) total payout over the two periods. Total surplus in the economy is
The marginal deadweight burden of taxation is dW=dt d . The envelope theorem applied to (1) implies that dV =dt d = P . Intuitively, since the …rm has already maximized social surplus net of tax revenue, the only …rst-order e¤ect of the tax on V is the mechanical revenue cost. This leads to the standard Harberger formula for deadweight burden:
where
denotes the elasticity of total payout P with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1 t d .
Note that (5) characterizes deadweight burden for both cash-rich and cash-constrained …rms. For cash-constrained (old view) …rms, P = f (I)=(1 + r) falls with t d and hence
For new view …rms, P does not respond to t d and hence " P = 0
Summary. These results are summarized in Table 1 . In the neoclassical model of pro…t-maximizing …rms, the e¢ ciency consequences of dividend taxation depend critically on the marginal source of investment funds. Since most investment in developed economies is undertaken by …rms with large amounts of retained earnings (Auerbach and Hassett 2002) , the cash-rich case is perhaps most relevant in understanding the aggregate e¤ects of dividend tax policy. This would imply that permanent changes in dividend tax policy have small e¤ects on aggregate economic e¢ ciency.
A key assumption underlying this conclusion is that …rms'managers choose policies solely to maximize …rm value. This assumption contrasts with the modern corporate …nance literature, which emphasizes the tension between executives' and shareholders' interests in explaining corporate behavior. In the next section, we incorporate these agency issues into the model.
An Agency Model of Firm Behavior
In this and the next section, we restrict attention to a cash-rich …rm that has f 0 (X) > 1 + r.
Firms with f 0 (X) < 1 + r never pay dividends. Since our goal is to construct a model consistent with available evidence on dividend payout behavior, it is the behavior of cash-rich …rms that is of greatest interest for the positive analysis. In the e¢ ciency analysis in section 5, we allow for cash-constrained …rms, thereby nesting both the old and new view models when deriving formulas for deadweight burden. We defer modelling equity issues to section 5 since no cash-rich …rm issues equity in equilibrium.
Model Setup
The basic source of agency problems in the modern corporation is a divergence between the objectives of managers and shareholders. We model the source of the divergence as a "pet project" that generates no pro…ts for shareholders but yields utility to the manager. In particular, the manager can now do three things with the …rm's cash X: pay out dividends D, invest I in a "productive" project that yields pro…ts f (I) for shareholders, or invest J in a pet project that gives the manager private bene…ts of g(J). Assume that both f and g are strictly concave.
The function g should be interpreted as a reduced-form means of capturing divergences between the managers'and shareholders'objectives. For example, the utility g(J) may arise from allocation of funds to perks, tunnelling, a taste for empire building, or a preference for projects that lead to a "quiet life". 11 While there is debate in corporate …nance about which of these elements of g(J) is most important, the underlying structure that determines g(J)
does not matter for our analysis.
Manager's Objective. The agency problem arises because shareholders cannot observe 1 1 There is a large literature in corporate …nance providing evidence for such agency models. See e.g., Rajan et al. (2000) , Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) .
real investment opportunities and hence have to let the manager decide about I, J, and D.
Shareholders push managers toward pro…t maximization through two channels: incentive pay and monitoring. Incentive pay is achieved through features of the manager's compensation contract such as share grants, bonuses, etc. We model such …nancial incentives by assuming that the shareholders compensate the manager with a fraction of the shares of the company.
Shareholders can also tilt managers'decisions toward pro…t maximization by monitoring. That is, the manager chooses I; J; and D to maximize
Let ! = (1 t d ) + denote the total weight that managers place on pro…ts. When ! is low, the manager has little stake in the pro…ts of the …rm and is therefore tempted to retain excess earnings and invest in the pet project. 12
Shareholders'Objectives. Next, we characterize how shareholders choose the level of monitoring ( ). Following Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , we assume that the costs of monitoring are incurred by each shareholder who chooses to monitor the …rm, whereas the bene…ts of better manager behavior accrue to all shareholders. This leads to a free-rider problem in monitoring.
To model this problem, suppose that there are N shareholders, each of whom owns a fraction i of the shares (so that
). Each shareholder chooses a level of monitoring i 0. The total monitoring level is = P i . Suppose that shareholders incur a …xed cost k if they choose to monitor the …rm (i.e. set i > 0). This …xed cost could re ‡ect for example the cost of going to stockholder meetings. In addition, suppose there is a convex and increasing variable cost c( i ) to do i units of monitoring (the intensive margin) that satis…es c 0 ( i = 0) = 0. Increasing is costly because reviewing managers'plans, …ring misbehaving managers, etc. requires e¤ort. Each shareholder chooses i to maximize his net pro…ts
where 1( i > 0) is an indicator function. In the Nash equilibrium, is determined such that each shareholder's choice of i is a best response to the others' behavior. It is well known from the public goods literature that monitoring will be below the social optimum (i.e., the level that would be chosen if one shareholder owned the entire …rm) in equilibrium. In addition, it is easy to see that there is a threshold level such that small shareholders with i < will not monitor the …rm, while large shareholders with i > do monitor. Since the number of large shareholders is typically small, it is natural to assume that these individuals cooperatively choose the level of monitoring by forming a "board of directors" that is in charge of monitoring the manager. Let B denote the total fraction of shares held by the board of directors. The board chooses to maximize its joint pro…ts net of monitoring costs, recognizing that none of the small shareholders will ever participate in monitoring and taking into account the manager's behavioral responses:
Ownership Structure. Thus far, we have speci…ed the choices and objectives of the three key players in our agency model -the manager, the board of directors, and the small shareholders. What remains to be speci…ed is the determination of the shares of these playersthat is, how the …rm's ownership structure ( and B ) is set. We draw a distinction between the short-run positive analysis and the long-run e¢ ciency analysis in the speci…cation of the …rm's ownership structure.
To understand the evolution of ownership structures, we use data on top executive share To quantify the e¤ect of the tax reform on , B , and D, we estimate a set of regression models. Since the variables plotted in Figure 1 all exhibit roughly linear time trends, we estimate models using OLS with two explanatory variables in Table 2 : a linear year trend and a "post reform" indicator which is 1 for all years including and after 2003. The change in managerial or board shareownership following the reform is small and statistically insigni…cant, although the point estimates should be interpreted cautiously in view of the relatively large standard errors. In contrast, the post-reform dummy is large and statistically signi…cant for total dividends. Consistent with the graphical evidence, these results suggest that the tax cut had little e¤ect on ownership structure in the short run.
Since the evidence on dividend payout behavior we are attempting to explain concerns the e¤ect of the 2003 dividend tax within a two year horizon, we take and B as …xed in our positive analysis. In the longer run, and particularly when new …rms are started, and B are presumably endogenous to the tax regime. Therefore, in the e¢ ciency analysis in section 5, we model how and B are determined. Allowing for endogenous ownership structure is particularly important in the e¢ ciency analysis because the deadweight cost of taxation depends critically on how and B are determined.
Manager Behavior
Having set up the model, we now characterize manager and board behavior in the short run, taking ownership structure as …xed. The manager's behavior is determined by his weight on
Assume that g 0 (0) > !f 0 (X), which guarantees an interior optimum in investment behavior.
Then I and D are determined by the following …rst-order conditions:
Let D(!) and I(!) denote the dividend and investment choices of the manager as a function of !. To characterize the properties of these functions, de…ne the threshold
Lemma 1 D(!) and I(!) follow threshold rules:
Proof. Consider ! !. Suppose the …rm sets D > 0. Then the …rst order conditions (11) and (10) imply that f 0 (I) = 1+r and hence
Now consider ! > !. Suppose the …rm sets D = 0. Then the …rst order conditions (10) and (11) imply that f 0 (I) 1 + r and hence I I S . This implies ! g 0 (X I) 1+r
. It follows that ! !, contradicting the supposition. Hence ! > ! ) D(!) > 0, and (11) and J(!) with quadratic production functions. When ! is below the threshold value !, the marginal value of the …rst dollar of dividends is negative in the manager's objective function.
The optimal level of dividends is therefore zero, the corner solution. Intuitively, if managers have a su¢ ciently weak interest in pro…t maximization, they wish to retain as much money as possible for pet projects, and do not choose to pay out dividends. For ! above this threshold value, the managers choose a level of dividends that balances the marginal bene…t of further investment in their pet project (g 0 (X I S D)=(1 + r)) with the marginal bene…t of paying out money and generating dividend income (!). Above !, increases in the weight on pro…ts ! lead to increases in dividends and reductions in pet investment on the intensive margin:
Now consider the manager's investment choice. When ! !, the manager pays no dividends, and splits retained earnings between investment in the pro…t-generating project and the pet project. He chooses I to equate his private marginal returns of investing in the two projects, as in equation (10). An increase in ! increases productive investment I and reduces pet investment J:
Once ! > !, the manager has enough cash to pay a dividend to shareholders. Since the marginal dollar of dividends could have been used for investment, he sets the investment level such that the marginal bene…t of paying an extra dollar of dividends (!) equals the marginal bene…t of investing another dollar in the pro…t-generating project (!f 0 (I)=(1 + r)). Hence the manager sets I such that f 0 (I)=(1 + r) = 1, implying I is …xed at I S for ! > !. Intuitively, the manager would only pay a dividend if his private return to further investment in the pro…table project was below the interest rate. Since the tradeo¤ between dividends and pro…table investment is the same for managers and shareholders, the manager only begins to pay a dividend once he has reached the optimal level of investment from the shareholder's perspective, I S .
Board Behavior
In the short run, the board's only decision is to choose the level of monitoring. The board takes B as …xed and chooses to maximize
where P (!) = D(!) + f (I(!))=(1 + r) denote the …rm's total payout as a function of !.
Because both D and P are (weakly) increasing in !, P (!) is also increasing in !. The …rst order condition with respect to is:
Intuitively, the board chooses such that the marginal increase in the board's share of pro…ts by raising ! is o¤set by the marginal cost of monitoring. The second-order condition for an interior maximum is:
Since c 0 ( = 0) = 0 by assumption, the optimal is always in the interior, and hence (16) must be satis…ed at the optimal level of monitoring (t d ). 13 This second-order condition turns out to be useful for the comparative statics analysis below.
Positive Analysis: E¤ects of Dividend Taxation
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of changes in dividend taxation on dividend payouts and investment behavior. Since the manager's behavior is fully determined by !, for any variable
We have already characterized
To calculate
, we implicitly di¤erence the board's …rst-order-condition for in (15) to obtain:
Combining (17) and (18) leads to:
We know that the denominator of this expression is positive from the board's second-order condition for in (16). The numerator is positive because P is increasing in ! and c is convex.
Equation (19) therefore shows that a reduction in the dividend tax rate leads to an increase in the weight ! that managers put on pro…ts. There are two channels through which this increase in ! occurs. First, a decrease in t d mechanically increases the net stake ( 
denote the change in a variable x caused by the tax cut, and note that ! > 0 from (19).
Proposition 1 A dividend tax cut has the following e¤ ects on behavior for a cash-rich …rm:
Proof.
Therefore D = 0. Since I + J + D = X, and X is …xed, it follows that I + J = 0.
Finally, it follows from (13) that
Hence, I > 0 and
by (11), it follows that f 0 (I(t 1 )) > 1 + r = f 0 (I S ), which implies I(t 1 ) < I(t 2 ). Hence I > 0 and J = D I < 0.
QED.
Proposition 1 shows that the tax cut (weakly) increases dividend payments for all cash-rich …rms because it raises the weight !(t d ) that managers place on pro…ts. The e¤ect di¤ers across 1 4 Technically, it is possible to have
> 0 if the third derivatives g 000 (J), f 000 (I), c 000 ( ) are su¢ ciently large in magnitude. When these functions are quadratic,
is unambiguously negative. Hence, barring sharp changes in the local curvature of the production functions, monitoring falls with the dividend tax rate. three regions of !. For managers who place a very low weight on pro…ts (!(t 2 ) < !), paying any dividends is suboptimal after the tax cut, and hence before the tax cut as well. Hence, D = 0 for such …rms. The second region consists of …rms who were non-payers prior to the tax cut (!(t 1 ) < !), but cross the threshold for paying when the tax rate is lowered to t 2 .
These …rms initiate dividend payments after the tax cut. Finally, the third region consists of …rms who had ! high enough that they were already paying dividends prior to the tax cut. The tax cut leads these …rms to place greater weight on net-of-tax pro…ts relative to the pet project, and therefore causes increases in the level of dividend payments on the intensive margin. Note that these changes in dividend payout policies occur in period 0 itself. This is consistent with the evidence that many …rms announced dividend increases in the weeks after the 2003 tax reform was enacted (Chetty and Saez, 2005) . Now consider the e¤ect of the tax cut on investment behavior. The tax cut increases the net-of-tax return to the pro…t-generating project while leaving the return to pet investment una¤ected. As a result, the manager substitutes from investing in perks to the pro…t-generating project, and I (weakly) increases while J falls. In the …rst region, where !(t 2 ) < !, total investment (I + J) is unchanged, since D = 0 and total cash holdings are …xed. In the second region, where the …rm initiates a dividend payment, investment in I rises to the socially e¢ cient level I S , while investment in J is reduced to …nance the dividend payment and the increase in I. In this region, total investment falls when the tax rate is cut. Finally, when ! > !(t 1 ), the manager maintains I at I S and reduces investment in J to increase the dividend payment.
An interesting implication of these results is that a dividend tax cut weakly lowers total investment I + J for cash-rich …rms with an agency problem. Total investment, I + J, is the measure that is typically observed empirically since it is di¢ cult to distinguish the components of investment in existing datasets. This prediction contrasts with the old view model, where a tax cut raises investment and with the new view model, where a tax cut has no e¤ect on investment. Intuitively, a tax cut reduces the incentive for cash-rich …rms to (ine¢ ciently) over-invest in the pet project. It is important to note that the same result does not apply to cash-constrained …rms in the agency model: A tax cut raises equity issues and productive (as well as unproductive) investment by such …rms. Hence, the aggregate e¤ect of a dividend tax cut on investment is ambiguous in the presence of agency problems. This result is potentially consistent with the large empirical literature on investment and the user cost of capital, which has failed to identify a robust relationship between tax rates and aggregate investment (see e.g., Chirinko 1993, Desai and Goolsbee, 2004) .
Next, we examine how the e¤ect of the tax cut on dividend payments varies across …rms with di¤erent ownership structures. It is again useful to distinguish between extensive and intensive margin responses. 
(iii) Intensive Margin. If ! !(t 1 ) and g and c are quadratic:
(i) The result follows directly from the e¤ect of and B on !. Observe that
using the second-order condition for in (16). Similarly,
> 0 yields the analogous result for B .
(ii) When !(t 1 ) < ! < !(t 2 ), D(t 1 ) = 0 and hence D = D(t 2 ). It follows that (iii) When ! < !(t 1 ), the dividend level is positive both at the initial and new tax rate and hence there is an intensive-margin response. Using equation (19), we have
1+r . Since g 00 (J(!)) is constant when g is quadratic and D 0 (!) = P 0 (!) = (1 + r)=g 00 , P 00 (!) = D 00 (!) = 0. Equation (20) Recognizing that c 00 and g 00 are constant and that g 00 < 0, it follows that
and decreasing in and B . Therefore,
with t 2 t 1 < 0, and therefore non-payers prior to the tax cut, those with large executive shareholding (high ) are more likely to initiate dividend payments after the tax cut. This is because managers with higher are closer to the threshold (!) of paying dividends to begin with, and are therefore more likely to cross that threshold. Second, conditional on initiating, …rms with higher initiate larger dividends. Since D(t 2 ), the optimal dividend conditional on paying, is rising in , the size of the dividend increase, D = D(t 2 ), is larger for …rms with higher values of in this region. Third, among the …rms who were already paying dividends prior to the tax cut, the intensive-margin increase in the level of dividends is generally larger for …rms with higher . 15 Intuitively, the manager's incentives are more sensitive to the tax rate when he owns a larger fraction of the …rm. Since a change in t d has a greater e¤ect on ! when is large, the change in dividends is larger.
These three results apply analogously to the board's shareholding ( B ), as shown in Figure   3b . Non-paying …rms with large B are closer to the threshold !, and are thus more likely to initiate dividend payments following a tax cut. In addition, the board's incentives to monitor the …rm are more sensitive to the tax rate when it owns a larger stake in the …rm. A change in t d thus has a greater e¤ect on when B is large, leading to a larger dividend response by the manager.
All of these predictions regarding the impact of ownership structure on dividend payout responses are consistent with evidence from the 2003 tax cut. This is because in our agency 1 5 As above, this result holds as long as there are no sharp changes in the local curvature of the production functions. If the third derivatives g 000 (J) and c 000 ( ) are su¢ ciently large in magnitude, it is possible to have In this sense, our model and Gordon and Dietz's analysis should be viewed as complementary e¤orts to explain di¤erent aspects of dividend policies.
Auxiliary Predictions. Our model predicts that …rms with more assets and cash holdings (higher X) are more likely to initiate dividend payments following a tax cut. 16 In contrast, neoclassical models that nest the old and new views (e.g. Sinn 1991 ) predicts that …rms with higher assets will respond less to a tax cut because they are more likely to …nance marginal investment out of retained earnings. Chetty and Saez (2005) document that …rms with higher assets or cash holdings were more likely to initiate dividends after the 2003 tax reform, consistent with the agency model.
The importance of the interests of "key players" (executives and large external shareholders) is underscored by Chetty and Saez's …nding that …rms with large non-taxable shareholders (such as pension funds) were much less likely to change dividend payout behavior in response to the 2003 tax reform. Although we have not allowed for heterogeneity in tax rates across shareholders in our stylized model, it is easy to see that the introduction of non-taxable shareholders would generate this prediction. In particular, if the board includes non-taxable large shareholders, a given change in t d has a smaller impact on the board's incentive to increase monitoring. As a result, the tax cut causes a smaller increase in and generates smaller D. 17 1 6 Firms with higher X are closer to the threshold of paying dividends, for two reasons: (1) ! is falling in X and (2) is rising in X. A tax cut is therefore more likely to make …rms with higher X cross the threshold and initiate dividend payments.
1 7 By assuming that all shareholders are taxed equally at rate t d , our model also ignores tax clientele e¤ects. Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) propose a theory of tax clienteles in which …rms strategically pay dividends to attract large shareholders as monitors. It would be interesting to explore the e¤ects of dividend tax changes in such a model in future work.
E¢ ciency Cost of Dividend Taxation
In this section we develop empirically implementable formulas for the deadweight burden of dividend taxation in the agency model. The e¢ ciency consequences of taxation depend on how the …rm's ownership structure ( and B ) are determined. As we discuss below, the e¢ ciency results when is …xed di¤er sharply from those when varies endogenously with the tax rate. When both and B are endogenous, it is convenient to write the formulas in
-the fraction of external shares held by the board -rather than B .
For expositional simplicity, we consider three models of increasing generality. First, we consider the case where B is …xed at 1, i.e. the …rm is owned by a single external shareholder ( B = 1) who chooses the manager's share . We then consider the case where B is …xed at a value less than one. Finally, we analyze a model where B is endogenously determined and …rms can issue new equity. We present a general formula for excess burden that nests the three cases in the third section. In the appendix, we show that two further extensionscorruption of the board and debt …nance -do not a¤ect this general formula.
Case I: Single External Shareholder [ B = 1]:
Determination of . We model the determination of managerial share ownership using the standard principal-agent model from the corporate …nance literature. The manager's stake is chosen to maximize the …rm's value, taking into account the manager's aversion to risk. To model risk aversion, it is necessary to introduce uncertainty into the …rm's payo¤.
Suppose that the pro…t-generating project now has a payo¤ f (I) only with probability ; with probability 1 it returns 0. The manager also receives a salary payment S independent from the pro…t outcome. The salary S is expensed to the …rm, i.e. deducted from pro…ts before dividend payments and dividend taxes are paid.
Let u(c) denote the manager's consumption utility, which we assume is strictly concave. In addition to this consumption utility, the manager continues to get utility from the pet project g. With this notation, the manager's expected utility is given by
denote the manager's net of tax share of pro…ts. As above, we assume that the manager's weight on pro…ts is increased by shareholder monitoring ( ), so that the manager's objective is to maximize
The manager's maximization program generates a mapping from ; , and S to a choice of investment and dividends, which we denote by the functions I( ; ; S) and D( ; ; S). Note that t d a¤ects the manager's choices only indirectly through its e¤ects on ; , and S.
The shareholder, who has linear utility, chooses , , and S to maximize his net payo¤
subject to the participation constraint of the manager Eu(D; I) = 0.
The participation constraint pins down the value of S given a choice of and , so we can write S = S( ; ). Let total expected pro…ts be denoted by P ( ; ) = D( ; ; S( ; )) + f [I( ; ; ( ; ))]=(1 + r) S( ; ):
With this notation, the shareholder's problem is to choose and to maximize:
If the manager's utility were linear, the shareholder would achieve his objective by setting = 1 and S su¢ ciently negative ("selling the …rm to the manager"), so that incentives of the principal and agent are perfectly aligned. When the manager is risk averse, however, increasing pay-for-performance ( ) while keeping expected the manager's utility constant forces the principal to raise total expected compensation. Since raising compensation reduces net pro…ts, the optimal is less than 1 when the manager is risk averse.
E¢ ciency Analysis. Since the manager's surplus is pinned at zero by his participation constraint, total surplus in the economy (W ) is the sum of the shareholder's welfare and government revenue:
To calculate the e¢ ciency cost of taxation, observe that dW S =dt d = P because and have already been optimized by the shareholder -a simple application of the envelope theorem. As a result,
is the elasticity of total dividend payouts with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This expression shows that the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation is positive even for cash-rich …rms in the presence of agency problems. The formula for deadweight burden coincides exactly with that obtained from the old view model. As in the old view model, deadweight burden is a secondorder function of the tax rate. That is, the marginal deadweight cost of taxation is typically small at low tax rates.
Intuition: First-Order vs. Second-Order E¢ ciency Costs. In view of the positive result that dividend taxation reduces dividend payouts, it is not surprising that dividend taxation has an e¢ ciency cost in the agency model. The reduction in dividend payments reduces government revenue from dividends (a …scal externality), and leads to an e¢ ciency cost through the standard Harberger channel.
The more surprising and interesting aspect of equation (23) is the magnitude of the deadweight burden. A basic intuition in the theory of taxation is that taxing a market with a pre-existing distortion leads to a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost (see e.g. Auerbach 1985 , Auerbach and Hines, 2003 , Goulder and Williams 2003 . That is, introducing a small tax in a previously untaxed market leads to a large deadweight burden if the market for that good is already distorted. Equation (23) appears to violate this principle, since it predicts a secondorder deadweight burden from dividend taxation despite the pre-existing distortion in the agency model. In particular, the manager under-provides dividends relative to the …rst-best social optimum, because he does not fully internalize the shareholder's welfare.
Why does our result di¤er from those of other studies in the tax literature? The preexisting distortions analyzed in earlier studies are assumed to be exogenously …xed. In contrast, the pre-existing distortion in our model is endogenously determined through optimization of the manager's contract to maximize net-of-tax surplus given the informational constraints. This endogenous determination of the distortion makes the deadweight cost of taxation second-order. To understand the intuition, observe that dividend taxation has a second-order e¢ ciency cost as long as the following two conditions hold.
First, the tax should have no impact on contracting possibilities between the private agents.
That is, the government should not be intrinsically better than the private market at resolving the informational constraints generating the distortion. Formally, shareholders must have a choice variable x such that k Second, the shareholder and manager must choose a contract that is second-best e¢ cient,
i.e. a contract that maximizes their joint surplus given the informational constraints. Formally, the requirement is that the variable x is chosen to maximize W S . To see why these two conditions imply a second-order e¢ ciency cost, recall that
where the latter equality uses condition 1. Next, note that condition 2 implies
, which implies that the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation is proportional to t 2 d . Intuitively, the government has no tools to a¤ect the manager's choice of dividends that the shareholders do not already have in our model. As long as the shareholders choose the manager's contract to maximize private welfare, the only …rst-order e¤ect of t d on the shareholder's utility is the mechanical e¤ect of paying more taxes ( P ). This …rst-order e¤ect is exactly o¤set by the mechanical increase in tax revenue (P ) in the government's budget. This leaves only the term arising from the behavioral response of P to t d , which reduces government revenue. Since this term is proportional to t d , deadweight burden is second-order.
Traditional analyses of models with exogenous pre-existing distortions e¤ectively assume that the private sector has no tool to a¤ect the size of the distortion. In that setting, the government has a technological advantage relative to the private sector, and can introduce …rst-order changes in e¢ ciency through taxes and subsidies. The same applies in our analysis: if were exogenously …xed at some level 0 not chosen to maximize the shareholder's welfare, the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation has an added (1 0 )
term and is therefore …rst-order. Intuitively, when is …xed, the government can change the manager's weight on pro…t maximization ! = (1 t d ) + costlessly through changes in t d whereas the private sector must rely on the costly mechanism. This advantage for the government leads to a …rst-order e¢ ciency gain from a dividend subsidy, and hence a …rst order e¢ ciency cost from dividend taxation.
The general lesson -which is of relevance beyond dividend taxation -is that identifying a pre-existing distortion is not adequate to infer that government taxes or subsidies will have …rst-order e¤ects on the economy, contrary to conventional wisdom. It is critical to understand the private sector's ability to a¤ect the size of the distortion -speci…cally whether the tools available to the private sector and government are the same and whether the private sector reaches the second-best e¢ cient outcome. 18 In the context of dividend taxation, there is no obvious reason that government taxation or subsidies are a superior method of resolving agency problems in …rms. Hence, all the models we will consider satisfy the …rst condition. 19 However, it is quite likely that the second condition -private contracts maximizing total net-of-tax surplus -breaks down in an economy with di¤use shareholders. In the next subsection, we show that dividend taxation has a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost in such an environment.
Case II. Dispersed Shareholders [ B < 1]
We now consider the case where the fraction of shares owned by the board ( B ) is …xed at a level less than 1, so that there are some dispersed "minority"shareholders who do not monitor 1 8 This result can be connected to the analysis of the …rst welfare theorem in economies with private information (Prescott and Townsend, 1984a, b) . When such a constrained …rst welfare theorem holds, a price distortion created by a small tax generates a second order e¤ect on welfare.
1 9 Of course, other government regulations and laws can a¤ect the contracting technology in a way that the private sector itself cannot achieve (see e.g, Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . For example, if shareholders rights are protected in courts, shareholders may have more control over managers, reducing c( ) and leading to a …rst-order e¢ ciency gain. The important point is that, keeping constant the regulatory structure embodied by the function c( ), dividend taxes do not a¤ect contracting technology directly. the …rm in equilibrium. The manager's objective remains the same as above for given values of = (1 t d ) and . The board of directors chooses and to maximize its own welfare:
This objective di¤ers from the objective used to choose and in the single shareholder model above in only one respect: the board places a weight B < 1 on net pro…ts since it owns only part of the outstanding shares. The minority shareholders are passive, and their welfare depends on the board and manager's choices:
Since the manager's surplus is zero as above, total surplus W in the economy is:
It is easy to see that dW B =dt d = B P because of the envelope conditions for and from board maximization. Furthermore, because maximizes (1 t d )P ( ; ), we have:
Since P is fully determined by and , the last term in this expression is equivalent to the derivative of P ( ; ) with respect to t d keeping constant, which we denote by dP=dt d j . It follows that
Equation (24) shows that when shareholders are dispersed, the deadweight cost of raising the dividend tax is the sum of the second-order term obtained with a single owner and a new term proportional to the fraction of dispersed shareholders (1 B ). Since this new term is not proportional to t d , it leads to a …rst-order deadweight cost of dividend taxation. The deadweight burden is …rst-order when B < 1 because the board chooses to maximize W B rather than total shareholder surplus (W B + W M ). As a result, the manager's contract is no longer second-best e¢ cient, breaking the second condition described in the previous section.
To understand the intuition for the …rst-order term more concretely, note that the board picks without taking account of the spillover bene…ts of monitoring to the dispersed shareholders. Since the dispersed shareholders prefer to free-ride, the equilibrium outcome is a level of monitoring that is suboptimal even relative to the second-best outcome where total social surplus is maximized net of monitoring costs. This e¤ectively creates a public good provision problem where a Pigouvian subsidy to increase supply of the public good (monitoring) would generate a …rst-order improvement in welfare. A dividend tax moves precisely in the opposite direction by further reducing the incentive to monitor, and thus creates a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost.
Note that in the …rst-order term in (24), the derivative of P with respect to t d is taken keeping constant. This is because the level of chosen by the board is optimal from the minority shareholders' perspective as well, since their payo¤s are proportional to each other aside from monitoring costs. The level of that maximizes B (1 t d )P ( ; ) also maximizes (1 B )(1 t d )P ( ; ). Intuitively, the board is able to share the cost of increasing the manager's shareownership with the minority shareholders because increasing dilutes the shareholding of both small and large shareholders proportionally. In contrast, the board is not able to share the cost c( ) with the minority shareholders, and therefore sets at a suboptimally low level. Thus, only the e¤ect of t d on P through leads to an externality e¤ect. This result con…rms the critical role of second-best ine¢ ciency of contracts in generating a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost of taxation. Gordon and Dietz (2006) assume that the board of directors acts on behalf of all shareholders. Therefore, in their model, there is no free riding monitoring issue and hence they do not obtain a …rst order e¢ ciency cost of taxation as we do here.
An Alternative Representation. In order to implement empirically (24), one would need to estimate dP=dt d j , which could be di¢ cult given available data. However, it is straightforward to obtain an alternative representation of the formula that is more convenient from an empirical perspective. Observe that:
The …rst order condition with respect to in the board's objective implies that P + (1
is the elasticity of manager shareownership w.r.t. the net-of-tax rate. Using the elasticity of dividend payments with respect to the net-of-tax rate as " P;1 t d , we can rewrite (24) as
Equation (26) is easier to implement empirically than (24) because one could in principle estimate how managerial shareownership ( ) responds to changes in t d to calculate " ;1 t d .
Case III. Equity Issues and Endogenous B
To complete our analysis, we now consider a model in which the ownership structure of the …rm is fully endogenous, i.e. both B and are determined endogenously. When B is endogenous, it is relatively straightforward to allow the …rm to issue new equity (E). To make equity issues potentially desirable, we drop the assumption that f 0 (X) > 1 + r, leaving
The model we analyze in this section therefore nests both the old and new view models, and the formula for deadweight burden applies to both types of …rms. We begin by modelling the determination of E and B , and then turn to the e¢ ciency analysis. The key result is that allowing for endogenous B and E does not a¤ect the formula for deadweight burden in (24).
Model of E and B . We break the manager and shareholder's choices into two stages. In the second stage, the manager chooses D and I conditional on his contract, as in Cases I and II analyzed above. In the …rst stage, the external shareholders choose E, and an acquirer buys a fraction B of the outstanding shares to take control of the board and set the manager's contract ( ; ). We model the …rst stage using a Nash equilibrium as follows. First, the dispersed shareholders issue equity E to maximize the value of the …rm, taking as given the choices of the board and manager since each small shareholder's equity issue decision has little impact on the …rm's overall cash holdings (X + E). The acquirer then makes a tender o¤er to acquire control by buying a fraction B of the company and making a contract ( ; ) with the manager. The acquirer picks ( B ; ; ) in order to maximize his surplus, taking the equity issue choice E of dispersed shareholders as given.
We begin by characterizing the manager's behavior in the second stage and works backwards. Conditional on , , and S( ; ), the …rm's manager chooses D and I to maximize
taking all other variables as …xed. The leads to a function P ( ; ; E) = D + f (I)=(1 + r) S that gives the total expected payout in terms of the manager's contract and the amount of equity raised.
To model how B is determined in the …rst stage, suppose that the company is initially owned by a group of dispersed shareholders. A wealthy shareholder enters the market and buys shares of the company to acquire control of the board through tender o¤ers. This acquiring shareholder starts with no holdings of the company ( 0 B = 0). The acquirer buys the shares in bulk at a price equal to the value of the shares after the acquisition (consistent with current practice in tender o¤ers), anticipating the …nal equilibrium value of the …rm. 20 Absent any additional bene…t from controlling a company, no individual would want to acquire the …rm because he must incur the monitoring costs c( ) when he has control of the board. To explain the presence of large shareholders, we introduce a non-market value of controlling a fraction B of the company K( B ). The function K re ‡ects the value of controlling a large company, e.g. through perks or directly utility of control. 21 Presumably, K( B ) is …rst increasing in B -as a very low value of B would not yield any control -and then decreasing once B is large, since complete control can be achieved with less than a 100% stake and liquidity constraints or lack of diversi…cation could make a large B costly to a risk averse shareholder. This inverted-U shape of K leads to an interior optimum in B . Taking E and t d as given, the board of directors chooses B , and to maximize
where P is the equilibrium price of the …rm, which the acquirer takes as …xed when making the tender o¤er to the dispersed shareholders. The …rst order conditions with respect to , , and B are:
(
In equilibrium, P = (1 t d )P ( ; ; E). Hence, the …rst order condition for B simpli…es to K 0 ( B ) = 0, which implies that B is independent of t d and E in equilibrium. The solution of the acquirer's problem thus yields functions (t d ; E), (t d ; E) and a constant B .
Finally, the dispersed shareholders choose E to maximize their total dividend payout net of equity investment. We assume that dispersed shareholders anticipate the takeover by the large shareholder when choosing E but do not internalize the e¤ect of E on and because they are small. Hence, E is chosen to maximize
The …rst order condition with respect to E is:
The solution to (32) yields a function E(t d ; ; ). The Nash equilibrium levels of ; ; and E are given by a triplet ( ; ; E ) such that each agent's behavior is optimal given the other's choice:
The equilibrium triplet is a function of t d , which is the only remaining exogenous variable in the model.
E¢ ciency Analysis.
Let the equilibrium value of the …rm be denoted by
Since the manager is held to the participation constraint as above, social surplus is
We can now state our general formula for the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation in the agency model.
Proposition 3
The excess burden with endogenous ownership structure and equity issues is given by
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating V with respect to t d gives
Using the …rst order conditions (28) and (32), this expression simpli…es to:
Next, using (29), di¤erentiating (33) implies that
which can be rewritten as (34). QED.
Equation (34) is exactly the same formula that we obtained in equation (24) with …xed B and no equity issues. Intuitively, introducing equity issues does not a¤ect the formula for
because there is no externality in the equity issue decision in our model. That is, E is set at the second-best e¢ cient level that maximizes total net-of-tax surplus. This is because shareholders, and not entrenched managers, decide how much equity is given to the …rm. When choosing the amount of equity, the dispersed shareholders internalize the bene…ts that accrue to other shareholders (e.g. the block holder) because of the ability to trade shares after the equity issue. The optimality of the equity decision also explains why the …rst-order term in (34) depends on dP=dt d keeping both and E …xed, as only the channel is subject to the free-rider ine¢ ciency problem. 22 Allowing for endogenous determination of B does not a¤ect the formula because the acquirer chooses B to maximize his private rather than social surplus (neglecting the minority shareholders). The free-rider externality problem therefore remains unresolved. As a result, dividend taxation distorts the choice of B and , both of which are taken into account in the empirical estimate of dP dt d j ;E , leaving the formula for
It is useful to contrast this result with the e¤ect of allowing for endogeneity of . In case I, we showed that deadweight burden is …rst-order when is …xed but second-order when is endogenous. Allowing for endogenous determination of does a¤ect the formula because is chosen to maximize social surplus in our model. In a model with multiple external shareholders, the costs of raising are shared through dilution, and thus is set at the second-best e¢ cient level. In contrast, standard economic principles suggest that B will not be chosen to maximize social surplus, since the costs of controlling and monitoring a …rm are borne only by the large shareholder. This contrast in the results on and B underscores the central role of the second-best e¢ ciency of private contracts in determining the e¢ ciency cost of taxation in a market with pre-existing distortions.
Extensions
In the appendix, we analyze two additional extensions of the model to evaluate the robustness of the formula in Proposition 3. First, we allow the …rm to raise funds through both debt (L) and equity. Debt pays a …xed interest rate r and also di¤ers from equity in its tax treatment, in that interest payments are not subject to the dividend tax. The corporate …nance literature has emphasized that debt …nance is more costly than equity because of the risk of an expensive bankruptcy, which explains why companies use equity despite the tax advantage of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . We model the cost of carrying debt in reduced-form through a convex cost function c L (L). As in the model above, the dispersed shareholders choose both E and L in the …rst stage; all other stages remain identical.
Second, we allow for an internal "culture of corruption" within the board of directors.
2 2 This value of dP dt d
j ;E can be estimated empirically using the same method as in Case II. In particular, an estimate of
can be used to remove the E channel from dP=dt d using the …rst condition (32), just as we removed the channel in (26).
Recent studies have argued that the board itself may receive implicit or explicit private bene…ts from the manager's pet projects (see e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Such transfers add to the bene…ts of control for the acquirer (K), but create a further disincentive to monitor the manager strictly. We model such corruption by adding a term g(J) to the board of director's welfare in (27).
In both of these extensions, we …nd that the formula for dW dt d is unchanged, though the values of the inputs (e.g. " P;1 t d ) will generally di¤er. Since these inputs are estimated empirically rather than simulated from assumptions about deep structural parameters, our method of computing the e¢ ciency cost of taxation is robust to these variations. The formula is robust because the envelope conditions used to derive (34) are una¤ected by introducing additional choice variables or constraints into the manager's and shareholders' problems, as long as these choices do not have externalities on other agents.
Following standard practice in the public …nance literature, we have ruled out share repurchases as a means of returning money to shareholders. Unlike the other simplifying assumptions, the exclusion of repurchases is a substantive limitation of our analysis. Share repurchases can a¤ect the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation in di¤erent ways, depending on how the repurchase decision is modelled. If repurchases are e¤ectively negative equity issues, our formula is unchanged since the analysis above permits negative E. This assumes, however, that the repurchase decision is made by shareholders rather than the manager. If the repurchase decision is made by the manager, and capital gains and dividends are taxed at the same rate, then (34) can still be used, replacing dividend payouts with the sum of dividends and repurchases. If the tax rates di¤er, the e¢ ciency cost is more complicated, and will in general depend on both the repurchase and dividend elasticities. Both payout choices create externalities on the dispersed shareholders and therefore create …rst-order distortions, potentially of opposite sign.
Since there is no widely accepted theory that explains why companies pay dividends despite the tax advantage of repurchases, we do not attempt to characterize the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation in an environment with repurchases here. In future work, it would be useful to understand the costs and bene…ts of share repurchases and incorporate them into an agency model to further improve our understanding of the e¢ ciency costs of dividend taxation.
Illustrative Calibration
A useful feature of the formula in Proposition 3 is that it depends on a small set of parameters that can in principle be estimated empirically: (1) " P;1 t d -the long-run elasticity of dividends with respect to the net-of-tax rate, (2) B -the fraction of shares owned by those on the board of directors, (3) -the fraction of shares owned by the manager, and (4)
the e¤ects of t d on and E. The remaining structure of the model -e.g. the monitoring and share acquisition cost functions c( ) and K( B ), the pet project payo¤ g(J), or the level of monitoring -are irrelevant conditional on knowing these values. This is important because estimating these functions would be di¢ cult, particularly since they represent reduced forms of complex contracts and payo¤s for shareholders, the board of directors, and management.
As an illustration, we calibrate the marginal deadweight cost of raising the dividend tax from the current rate of 15% relative to the marginal revenue from raising the tax. We ignore equity issues in this calculation. Note that managerial share ownership is quite small relative to " P;1 t d in practice: in the Execucomp sample analyzed in Figure 1 , total executive shareownership averages less than = 0:03 in all years. 23 Therefore, as an approximation we assume = 0. This simpli…es the formula in (26) to:
The marginal revenue from raising the dividend tax rate is
Using data on the shareholding of members of the board of directors and other large ( (35) and (36), we obtain
2 3 Although our calculation focused solely on stock ownership, accounting for other forms of incentive-based pay is unlikely to raise signi…cantly. Existing studies have measured more broadly by computing the change in the wealth of CEOs when the …rm's value increases by $1. These studies estimate that is less than 1% on average for CEOs of publicly traded corporations in the U.S. (see Murphy 1999 for a survey).
Generating $1 of additional revenue from the dividend tax starting from a rate of 15% would generate deadweight loss of 93 cents in the short run. 15 cents of this deadweight burden comes from the conventional Harberger e¤ect and 78 cents comes from the …rst-order ampli…cation of the free-rider distortion in the agency model. These calculations should be viewed as illustrative because they ignore several potentially important issues. First, and most importantly, the estimate of " P;1 t d in Chetty and Saez (2005) is a short-run elasticity: it compares changes in dividend payments in a three-year window around the 2003 reform. The long-run elasticity could be signi…cantly smaller if companies paid out excess cash holdings that they had built up immediately after the tax cut.
In addition, as shown in Figure 1 , the ownership structure of the …rm appears to have remained roughly constant over the horizon we studied. In the longer run, and particularly when new …rms are started, and E would respond to the tax regime, further a¤ecting " P;1 t d and introducing a wedge between dP=dt d and dP=dt d j ;E . A second limitation of our calibration is that it ignores share repurchases. In Chetty and Saez (2006) , we present suggestive evidence that companies did not substitute dividends for repurchases, but further analysis is needed on this issue. Third, our analysis ignores entirely signalling issues. 24 Finally, as in any normative analysis, one must consider the distributional implications of dividend taxation in addition to its e¢ ciency consequences. If the incidence of dividend taxes are borne by wealthy shareholders, it is possible that taxing dividends does not have a large impact on social welfare from a utilitarian social welfare perspective.
In view of these caveats, we believe that this analysis is most useful in providing two qualitative lessons. First, the main source of ine¢ ciency from taxing dividends is the undermonitoring of managers because of the free-rider problem, and not the classic distortion to revenue emphasized in the "old view"model. Second, from a policy perspective, our analysis suggests that dividend taxation should be used relatively little given its ine¢ ciency in raising revenue if the government has other tools (e.g. progressive income taxation integrated with corporate taxation) that have similar distributional e¤ects but do not create …rst-order distortions. In fact, a corrective dividend subsidy may be desirable to subsidize monitoring and correct the free-rider problem.
Conclusion
The public …nance literature on corporate taxation is based primarily on neoclassical models of pro…t-maximizing …rms. In contrast, since Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the corporate …nance literature has emphasized deviations from pro…t maximization by managers as a central determinant of …rm behavior. The broad aim of this paper has been to take a step toward bridging this gap. We analyzed the e¤ects of dividend taxation in a model in which managers' interests di¤er from shareholders. The agency model generates a set of predictions that explain several pieces of empirical evidence that pose problems for neoclassical models.
The agency theory yields new insights into the e¢ ciency costs of dividend taxation. The main result is that the e¢ ciency consequences of dividend taxation depend on the ownership structure of the …rm. If the …rm is owned by a single principal who monitors the manager, dividend taxation has a second-order e¢ ciency cost. Despite overinvestment due to the agency problem, the Harberger formula applies because the private market still achieves a second-best e¢ cient outcome given the informational constraints inherent in the managershareholder relationship. However, if the …rm is owned by many shareholders, as are most modern corporations, the private market is unlikely to achieve a second-best e¢ cient outcome because of free-riding in monitoring. In this environment, dividend taxation has a …rst-order e¢ ciency cost because it exacerbates the under-monitoring problem.
Our analysis suggests that agency issues may be much more important factors in the excess burden of taxation than Harberger revenue distortions. Further research on the interaction between taxes and agency problems could yield new insights into the welfare consequences of other important corporate tax policies, such as the corporate tax, the capital gains tax, and tax treatment of interest payments.
Corrupt Board.
Consider the model in Case II with …xed B for simplicity; as above, allowing for endogenous determination of B does not a¤ect the results. To allow for imperfect monitoring of the managers by the board because of internal corruption, we introduce an additional term g(J)
into the board's welfare. This changes the board's objective when setting and to
The manager's problem and dispersed shareholders'welfare are the same as in the basic model conditional on and . Total surplus is
As is now familiar, we exploit the envelope conditions for ; and in W B to obtain:
which again coincides with the formula for deadweight burden in (26). The g(J( ; )) term can e¤ectively be viewed as a modi…cation of the cost function c( ). Since this function does not enter our formula for deadweight burden, allowing for internal corruption via > 0 does not a¤ect the results. 25 Debt Finance.
There is a large literature in corporate …nance on the capital structure of …rms (see e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976 or more recently Zwiebel, 1996) . In this section, we assume that the …rm can raise additional funds for investment from the external capital market. The …rm raises funds from both the stock market via new equity issues (E) and the bond market by issuing debt (L 0), which pays a …xed return r that is deducted from pro…ts. Following the standard explanation of why …rms do not …nance all investment using debt, we assume that issuing debt has costs (e.g. risk of bankruptcy), which we model through a reduced-form function c L (L). The …rm's total cash available for dividends and investment is X + E + L but the …rm has to repay (1 + r)L at the end of period 1 (i.e., has to repay L from a period 0 perspective). The …rm and shareholder's choices can be broken into two stages as in the Case III studied in the text. First, there is a Nash game where dispersed shareholders issue debt and equity (L; E) and the board of directors forms through costly acquisitions of a large block of shares ( B ) and chooses a contract ; with the manager. Second, the manager chooses D and I.
Conditional on , , E, L the …rm's manager chooses D and I to maximize
In this setting, the …rm's total expected dividend payout is
As in Case III in the text, conditional on E, L, and t d the board of directors chooses , , and B to maximize
The …rst order condition for B is again K 0 ( B ) = 0 which shows that B is independent from other variables.
Finally, the dispersed shareholders choose E and L to maximize their total payout net of equity investment conditional on ; , and t d :
Those maximization programs lead to a Nash equilibrium ( ; ; E ; L ) which depends on t d . We denote again the net value of the …rm (1 t d )P ( ; ; E; L) in equilibrium by
Social surplus is de…ned as
K( B ) as in Case III above. Because, L maximizes P ( ; ; E; L) so that @P=@L = 0, the same computation as in case III can be repeated to evaluate V 0 (t d ) and dW=dt d and we obtain exactly the same expression as (34).
Appendix B: Data for Figure 1 and Table 2 Data Sources. Calibration of B in Section 6. The value for B used in the calibration is based on the sum of the average fraction of shares held by non-employee directors and the average fraction held by other large independent blockholders (de…ned as holdings that exceed 5% of the total shares outstanding). The data on large blockholders comes from the dataset constructed by Dlugosz et. al. (2004) , available through WRDS.
The average level of non-employee director ownership between 1998 and 2005 is 2.4%. The average level of outside blockholder ownership (as de…ned by the variable SUMOUT) between 1998 and 2001 (the last year of data) is 7.5%. In both calculations, the average is calculated as the mean weighted by each …rm's average market capitalization over the sample period.
Summing these two estimates, we obtain B = 10%. NOTE--This table summarizes the firm's choice of dividends (D), equity issues (E), and investment (I) in the neoclassical and agency models. Behavior depends on the level of initial cash holding X, which varies across the columns. I S denotes the efficient investment level such that f'(I S )=1+r. In the agency model, shareholders issue equity if cash holdings are sufficiently low. In this case, the efficiency cost t d remain the same as those listed in the last row of the table. 
Figure 3b
Effect of Tax Cut on Dividends by Board Shareownership NOTE-These figures show how the effect of a dividend tax cut on dividends varies across firms with different ownership structures. In Figure 3a , the lower curve plots dividends versus the fraction of shares owned by the manager () when the tax rate is 40%. The upper curve plots the same when the tax rate is 20%. Figure 3b plots dividends versus the fraction of shares owned by the board of directors in the two tax regimes. Simulations are based on the same parametric assumptions as in Figure 2 along with c 10 2 .
